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STATE OF UTAH,
I'l.iiniiu

Case Nos. 20080812-CA
20080813-C A
20080814-CA
20080815-CA

\pptikc,

vs.
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR,

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §§ 77-18a-l and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). Other issues relating to
jurisdiction are discussed below.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The threshold determination in Mr. Brinar's appeal is whether this Court

lacks jurisdiction over appeal issues relating to the improper entry <>i IH.N guilty pleas and
prim Hiuiisd's l.iilim l o h h ,ipprnpn,iU ,n lions

IIMMIIIIIMW

Ins rlienl's pk'us Questions

of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Tenorio, 156 P.3d 854, 2007 UT App 92.

I' K b^SERVAl ION OF THE AK<;i IMI, Nl
'' brief is filed because Mr. Brinar's arguments have not been
preserved. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Sta^ v Clayton, 639P.2d 168
(Utah 1981).
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STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are
contained in this brief or Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Withdrawal of Plea)
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101 et seq (Post-Conviction Remedies Act)
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (Post-conviction relief)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The District Attorney's office filed four cases against Mr. Brinar (Cases
081400122; 081401032; 081401294; 081401405). On or about July 1, 2008, during a
change of plea proceedings which encompassed all of the pending cases, Mr. Brinar
pleaded guilty to Burglary, a 2nd degree felony (case 081400122); Theft by Deception, a
3rd degree felony (case 08401032); Kidnapping, a 3rd degree felony (case 081401294);
and Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle, a 3rd degree felony (case 081401405).
On or about August 22, 2008, the trial court sentenced Mr. Brinar to, inter alia,
indeterminate prison terms of 1-15 years for Burglary; followed by a consecutive sentence
of 0-5 years for Theft by Deception; followed by a consecutive sentence of 0-5 years for
Kidnapping; and finally followed by a consecutive sentence of 0-5 years for Receiving or
Transferring a Stolen Vehicle. R 56, pg 32. Prior to, or contemporaneous with, the
sentencing proceeding (held on August 22, 2008), no evidence exists in the record as to
Mr. Brinar's intent to withdraw his guilty pleas (entered July 1, 2008). Instead, off-therecord discussions took place between Mr. Brinar and his attorney.
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On or about September 9, 2008, Mr. Brinar filed a motion which, inter alia,

prior " on 111M; I P f r. Brinar's motion
I, Troy Brinar hereby ask V .-»*: ••~.-* " ~<>ur for \ neu fual and/or proceedings.
Based on the ineffectiveness of v UUHNCI and the fact that f was forced by Michael
Massae of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc, into a plea bargain or into
plea[d]ing out and further was made unaware of the penalties that could be
imposed at sentencing but was instructed to be quiet aidd do what my coun[se]l
advised. Further I am Not Guilty
See Letters from I roy Briner to Judge Adkins, date si an mod September ' \. 2008
(attached as Addendum B). Mr. Brinar's motion was fin 11 ailci M.S sentencing date.
ThereatU11, lln nnliu -. ml uppe^l wvu il : *

-•

cases late r

consolidated for purposes of tliii ar *«.
STATEMENT O F THE FACTS
Mr. Brinar advances man) tactual aigumeni'. including (lull lit i linnk'd ion ihe
ineffective assistance of coi insel an ::l 1:1 ic: (h i) v alidit; - of his guilty pleas, "which were not
knowingly, intelligently; and voluntarily entered. In the future, the factual basis of his
arguments will have to be made part of the record at an evidentiary he,* • ~
However, this i nun inusi liisi mala ri ihicshnld drtcnniiiiiiion a;-, no wlieilin [ III
Brinar

: K

. ctionally able to even raise his arguments in this appeal
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The issues M r . h* n?.r n o w ceeVc t o r^jse are untin h for nun)* appeal

!

Assuming, <//•#*.•-,.

* <

!

-^

. - ohisJulvl,

2008 pleas have merit, the time to have made such challenges would have been before the
^3_

August 22, 2008, sentencing proceeding. Notwithstanding the sympathetic claim that
prior counsel had misled or misinformed him when he changed his plea, the plain
language of the applicable statute and accompanying case law precludes review on a
direct appeal. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such issues. The
remedy for Mr. Brinar is through post-conviction relief or under Rule 65C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. MR. BRINAR IS JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED FROM
RAISING ISSUES RELATED TO HIS JULY L 2008 GUILTY PLEAS
Existing authority is quite clear on whether Mr. Brinar, who now seeks to
withdraw his guilty pleas, entered on July 1, 2008, is precluded from doing so on direct
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(b) states, "A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is
announced/' Id. In this case, no motion was made to withdraw the pleas before
sentencing. Accordingly, after the trial court's imposition of sentence, rendered on
August 22, 2008, the statute stripped Mr. Brinar of the ability to withdraw his guilty
pleas.
Case law similarly prevents Mr. Brinar from withdrawing his pleas despite claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, exceptional circumstances, or plain error. State v.
Tenorio, 156 P.3d 854, 2007 UT App 92 (attached as Addendum C). The issues raised in
Tenorio would be analogous to the issues raised by Mr. Brinar, but like in Tenorio, such
issues may not be raised on direct appeal. Accord State v. Connie Sue Lebow, 2006 UT
-4-

App 27, Case No. 200500611-CA (filed February 2, 2006) (unpublished memorandum
decision) ("Absent a timely motion to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack jurisdiction
to consider any issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including whether a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea agreement.")
Nevertheless, the statute and Tenorio set forth the procedural avenues for relief (in
circumstances other than through a direct appeal). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(c), "Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. Tenorio reflects the same option.
"Defendants challenge to his guilty plea, having been made outside the time period
specified by statute, can only be pursued under ... [the] Post-Conviction Remedies Act,
and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, f 8, 156 P.3d
854 (citing State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, \ 6, 148 P.3d 990). Such avenues of relief are
the only available remedies to Mr. Brinar, who is attempting to withdraw his guilty pleas
in this direct appeal.
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel for Mr. Brinar files this "Anders" brief and seeks
permission from this Court to withdraw from the appeal. As of March 6, 2009, appellate
counsel (or his office) have caused to be delivered a copy of this drafted brief to Mr.
Brinar for his review. Moreover, during the same approximate time period, appellate
counsel discussed the above principles with Mr. Brinar.
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Counsel certifies that during his discussions with Mr. Brinar, no additional issues
were raised in regards to this direct appeal. Mr. Briner also memorialized in writing that
he has no corrections, edits, or additional issues to add to the brief. In the future, Mr.
Brinar1 does not want to be foreclosed from raising appropriate plea issues (e.g. his pleas
were not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily) and companion ineffective
assistance of counsel issues (e.g. at or about the time of the plea, counsel exerted coercive
tactics, gave improper advice, and failed to communicate properly). However,
notwithstanding the present jurisdictional bar on raising such issues on direct appeal, no
other issues were presented for briefing.

CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant, Mr. Troy Brinar, respectfully requests this Court to examine
the above-stated arguments to determine if any nonfrivolous claims may be appropriately
advanced on direct appeal. It is also requested that counsel's Motion to Withdraw be
granted.
SUBMITTED this?/]

day of March, 2009.

Ronald S. Fujino
Attorney for Mr. Brinar

1

A copy of this drafted brief was delivered to Mr. Brinar and it was also attached to a
motion for extension of time, filed in this Court.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVER^
I hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original and seven copies of
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, two copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, and one copy to Mr. Troy Anthony Brinar, Offender No.
137823, at the Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020-0250, thisTr^day
of March, 2009.
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Addendum A
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 Withdrawal of Plea)
(Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101 et seq Post-Conviction Remedies Act)
(Utah R. Civ. P. 65C Post-conviction relief)

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court
and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies ActJ"
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies.
(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct
appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review,
including extraordinary or common law writs. Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are
governed by the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of
a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-103. Applicability - Effect on petitions.
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107, this chapter applies only
to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1,1996.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief- Retroactivity of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction
for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the following
grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling
statutory provisions;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction
or sentence, because:
(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense
or subject to the sentence received; or
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and
sentence became final on direct appeal, and that:
(1) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or
sentence became final; or
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which
the petitioner was convicted.
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner
establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of
the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts
introduced at trial or during sentencing.
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is
innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3,
Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105. Burden of proof.
(1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant relief

without determining that the petitioner is entitled to relief under the provisions of this chapter
and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal case under review.
(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78B-9-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief - Exception.
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have
been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during
the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that
the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. Any court may raise
a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)©, a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief.
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause
of action has accrued.
I
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following
dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no
appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has% urisdiction over the case, if an
appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the
United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on
the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established.

(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented
from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to
physical or mental incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3).
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition
asserting:
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401.
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 358, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief - Notice.
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or sentencing proceeding
as appropriate.
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed for five days.
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that
the respondent will pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no
action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during the stay period
that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the order to the custodian
of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice of intent to appeal the court's decision, the stay provided
for by Subsection (2)(a) shall remain in effect until the appeal concludes, including any petitions
for rehearing or for discretionary review by a higher court. The court may lift the stay if the
petitioner can make the showing required for a certificate of probable cause under Section
77-20-10 and URCP 27.
(d) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the petitioner, the trial
court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail,
discharge, or other matters that may be necessary.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288,2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel.
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request
of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the
post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. Counsel who represented the petitioner at
trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors:

(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an
evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance
of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the
basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-110. Appeal - Jurisdiction.
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction
relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78A-3-102 or 78A-4-103.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-201. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days.
A post-conviction remedy may not be applied for or entertained by any court within 30 days
prior to the date set for execution of a capital sentence, unless the grounds for application are
based on facts or circumstances which developed or first became known within that period of
time.
i

Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under
Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the
clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The
petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue
on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in
relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of
the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause
shown. The petition shall state:
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place o incarceration;

(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of
proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those
proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to
relief;
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of
probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal;
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons
why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the
trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the
petition:
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct
appeal of the petitioner's case;
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil
proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss
authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of
which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the
judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the
clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is
apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in
the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face.
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with
the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or
conclusions of law.

(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the
pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(g)(2)(c) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing
of the petition.
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to
comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave
to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good
cause shown.
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a
case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the
petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition
that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and
memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(I) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by
mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of
time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of
the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service by mail)
after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by
memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless
ordered by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing
or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the
conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition.
At the prehearing conference, the court may:
(j)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the
evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be

conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before
the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is
confined.
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon
motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is
necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; stay.
(m)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony
conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a
new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by
these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the
stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order
to release the petitioner.
(m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial
court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail,
discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any
party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be
paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody
of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78 A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner
and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and
costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes
governing appeals to those courts.

Addendum B
(Letters from Troy Briner to Judge Adkins, dated circa September 11, 2008)
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT

vs.

Case No: 081400122

TROY ANTHONY BRINAR,
Defendant.

Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
Date:
September 15, 200*

Court reviewed letters from the defendant, a copy of the letters
were sent to the District Attorney's office and to Mike Masse, LDA.

T%_—.

-,

/ -\ _, ^+_ ^

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT

vs

Case No: 081401032

TROY ANTHONY BRINAR,
Defendant

Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
Date:
September 15, 200£

Court reviewed letters from the Defendant, a copy of the letters
were mailed to the District Attorney's office and to Mike Masse,
LDA.

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT

vs .

Case No: 081401207

TROY ANTHONY BRINAR,
Defendant

Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
Date:
September 15, 2008

The Court reviewed the letters from the defendant, a copy of the
letters were mailed to the District Attorney's office and the Mike
Masse, LDA.

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT

vs .

Case No: 081401257

TROY ANTHONY BRINAR,
Defendant

Judge: ADKINS, ROBERT
Date:
September 15, 200!

Court reviewed the letters from the defendant, a copy of the
letters were mailed to the District Attorney's office and the Mike
Masse, LDA.

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN CITY,
Plaintiff,

LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT

vs.

Case No: 081401312

TROY ANTHONY BRINAR,
Defendant,

Judge: ADKINS, ROBERT
Date:
September 15, 200!

Court reviewed letters from the defendant, copies of the letters
were mailed to the District Attorney's office and to Mike Mase,
LDA.

3RD D I S T . COURT - W E S T JORDAN
SALT L A K E COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H

STATE OF U T A H ,
Plaintiff,

L E T T E R S FROM

vs .

Case N o :

TROY A N T H O N Y

BRINAR,
Defendant

DEFENDANT

081401441

Judge: ADKINS, ROBERT
Date:
S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 200*

T h e Court r e v i e w e d the letters from the d e f e n d a n t , copies of the
letters w e r e m a i l e d to the District A t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e and to M i k e
M a s s e , LDA>

Addendum C
State v. Tenorio, 156 P.3d 854, 2007 UT App 92

This opinion is subject to revision befor^
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20050976-CA

v.

F I L E D
(Matfch 1 5 , 2007)

Robert Osorio Tenorio,
Defendant and Appellant.

2007 UT App 92

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 041904383
The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg
Attorneys:

Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme.
DAVIS, Judge:
^"1
Defendant Robert Osorio Tenorio appeals his convictions
resulting from guilty pleas to communications fraud, a second
degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (d) (Supp.
2006), and forgery, a third degree felony, see id. § 76-6-501(3)
(2003). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
H2
Defendant is in this country illegally, but has lived and
worked here for several years. In 1996, an individual on the
street gave Defendant a social security number, and Defendant
later obtained a corresponding social security card. Although
the card was counterfeit, the social security number was valid
and belonged to a now-deceased individual from New York. In
1999, Defendant used the social security card to apply for a
mortgage guaranteed by the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). The application was approved, and
Defendant received a loan in the amount of $83,871, secured by

his newly purchased home. Defendant subsequently defaulted on
the loan, which caused HUD to lose over $50,000.
f3
Eventually, the State charged Defendant with forgery and
communications fraud, or alternatively, theft by deception. On
April 22, 2005, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the
State whereby he pleaded guilty to forgery and communications
fraud. Before entering Defendant's plea, the trial court
verified on the record that Defendant understood the nature of
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and that he was
"severely limiting [his] appeal rights." The trial court also
explained to Defendant the elements of his crimes and the
associated penalties. Finally, after hearing the State's
intended evidence, the trial court concluded that those facts
established the elements of the crimes with which Defendant was
charged.
14
On July 22, 2005, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a
suspended term of 365 days in jail. Defendant did not move to
withdraw his guilty plea prior to the court's imposition of
sentence. One month after the sentencing hearing, the State
moved to correct Defendant's sentence. At an October 7, 2005
hearing on the State's motion, the trial court corrected
Defendant's sentence and ordered him to serve two suspended
prison terms: zero to five years for the forgery conviction and
one to fifteen years for the communications fraud conviction. On
October 20, 2005, Defendant filed a notice of appeal "from the
final judgment/order rendered against him on the 7th day of
October, 2005."
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1*5
Defendant urges us to hear his appeal and reverse his guilty
plea under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel,
exceptional circumstances, and plain error. In response, the
State claims that we lack jurisdiction to consider Defendant's
appeal. "An appellate court's 'determination of whether it has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of law.'"
State v.
Norris, 2002 UT App 305,1(5, 57 P.3d 238 (quoting Miller v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,118, 44 P.3d 663). Defendant
alternatively asserts that our statutory scheme and related case
law governing appellate review of guilty pleas is
unconstitutional. "Constitutional challenges to statutes present
questions of law, which [appellate courts] review for
correctness." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,1)42, 99 P.3d 820
(quotations and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
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i[6
Although Defendant raises various challenges to his guilty
plea, this court cannot review his claims unless Defendant has
complied with Utah code section 77-13-6(2) . See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6(2) (Supp. 2006). Accordingly, to challenge a guilty
plea, a defendant must move to withdraw the plea prior to the
trial court's announcement of sentencing.
See id. at § 77-136(2)(b) ("A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be
made by motion before sentence is announced."). A defendant's
failure to do so precludes a challenge to that plea, except as
provided under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see id. §§ 7835a-101 to -304 (2002 & Supp. 2006), and rule 65C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (c) (stating that any challenge to a guilty plea
not made prior to sentencing "shall be pursued under . . . [the]
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure").
t7
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the
language of Utah Code section 77-13-6(2) to be jurisdictional.
See Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11,18, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
("Section 77-13-6 (2) (b) imposes a jurisdictional bar on latefiled motions to withdraw guilty pleas . . . ." (quotations and
citation omitted)); State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,120, 114 P.3d
585 (stating that "section 77-13-6(2)(b) is indeed
jurisdictional"); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^3, 40 P.3d 630
(refusing to consider, for lack of jurisdiction, the defendant's
attacks on his guilty plea because he failed to comply with
section 77-13-6(2)); see also Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,1)36,
122 P.3d 628 ("Any challenge to . . . a plea agreement, or to
waivers contained therein, may only be undertaken following a
timely motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea."). Thus, a
defendant's failure to comply with section 77-13-6(2) precludes
this court from reviewing his or her appeal from a guilty plea.
1j8
Here, Defendant pleaded guilty on April 22, 2005, and did
not move to withdraw or otherwise challenge his plea prior to
sentencing on July 22, 2005. Once the trial court entered its
sentencing order, Defendant lost his right to withdraw his guilty
plea. Therefore, Defendant's failure to comply with section 7713-6(2) precludes our review of his appeal because we lack
jurisdiction to do so. 1 See Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at M 1 9 - 2 0 . A s

x

The State additionally argues that Defendant's appeal was
untimely because he did not file his notice of appeal within
thirty days of the entry of his guilty plea, as required by rule
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
See Utah R. App. P.
4. We do not reach this issue because Defendant's failure to
(continued...)

20050976-CA

3

such, "Defendant's challenge to his guilty plea, having been made
outside the time period specified by statute, can only be pursued
under . . . [the] Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and rule 65C,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT
76,1|6, 148 P. 3d 990 (quotations and citation omitted).
i[9
Defendant argues at length that despite his failure to
comply with section 77-13-6(2), we may review his claim under
ineffective assistance of counsel, exceptional circumstances, or
plain error. Defendant concedes that current case law prevents
us from reviewing his claim under plain error and ineffective
assistance. See, e.g. , State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,114, 40
P.3d 646 (holding that court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
defendant's plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
claims due to the defendant's failure to timely move to withdraw
his guilty plea). Nonetheless, Defendant asks us to overturn
this precedent. 2 This we cannot do because we are bound by our
previous decisions as well as the decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court. "Vertical stare decisis . . . compels a court to follow
strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court."
State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) . Moreover, in
accordance with horizontal stare decisis, "the first decision by
a court on a particular question of law governs later decisions
by the same court." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah
1993). While a court will overrule its own precedent in the
limited circumstances where it is "'clearly convinced that the
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by
departing from precedent, 1 " State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34,^8, 999
P.2d 1 (quoting Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (additional quotations
and citation omitted)), such circumstances are not present here.
1110 Finally, Defendant asserts that section 77-13-6(2)
unconstitutionally violates "the right to counsel, violates the
due process right to a knowing and voluntary plea, prevents

1

(. . .continued)
timely move to withdraw his guilty plea is dispositive.
defendant also claims that this case involves a "rare
procedural anomaly" and that we may review his claim under
exceptional circumstances to avoid "manifest injustice."
See
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . However,
because Defendant cites no authority permitting us to circumvent,
via the exceptional circumstances doctrine, the legion of cases
explaining our lack of jurisdiction and the requirements of
section 77-13-6(2), see Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (Supp. 2006),
we decline to do so.
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[r]ule 11 [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] protections
for defendants, and denies the right to a full and fair appeal."
While we recognize the fundamental logic of Defendant's position,
we have no jurisdiction to address these claims. It is worth
noting, however, that the Utah Supreme Court has determined that
the "jurisdictional bar" imposed by Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)
is "constitutionally permissible." Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at ^ 1 .
CONCLUSION
i|ll Because we lack jurisdiction to hear Defendant's attack on
his guilty plea in this direct appeal, we affirm his convictions
for communications fraud, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(d),
and forgery, see id. § 76-6-501(3).

James Z. Davis, Judge

H12

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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